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 The Sugar-Pie Game 
Abstract: 
Playing a bargaining game the players are trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. However, HE is 
not very keen on sweets and does not prefer a piece of the pie if the size of the pie is too small or too 
large. In HIS view, too small or too large pies are not of a reasonable quality. In contrast, SHE, the 
second actor, likes sweets what ever they are. HE is a soft negotiator but SHE is a tough negotiator. The 
paper addresses the problem: what should be HIS power of negotiations if an equal ½-division of the 
pie is desirable. 
JEL: C78 
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Introduction. The players at the bargaining table usually are trying to split an economic surplus in 
a rational and efficient way. To be sure, the main problem, what the players try to solve during 
negotiations, is the slicing of the pie. Slicing depends upon characteristics and expectations of 
bargainers. Given that the expectations of players are non-conforming, i.e., single peaked for the 
first in contrast to the other, the traditional bargaining procedure may be put differently—no longer 
a modus operandi of how to split the pie. The procedure, instead of slices, can be resettled, then, to 
proceed on distinct levels of one parameter—parametrical interval of the size, which turns to be the 
scope of negotiations. In fact, Cardona and Ponsattí (2007: 628) noticed that "the bargaining 
problem is not radically different from negotiations to split a private surplus," when all in the 
bargain have the same, conforming expectations. This is even true when the expectations of the 
second player are principally non-conforming, not single peaked but concave. Indeed, in the case of 
non-conforming expectations, related to individual rationality, (Roth 1977), also known as "well 
defined bargaining problem" or bargaining set, the scope of negotiations allows dropping the 
axiom of "Pareto Efficiency." Thus, combined with the breakdown point the well-defined problem, 
instead of slices, can be solved inside parametrical interval of the size of the pie. 
With these remarks in mind, the procedures of negotiating on slices and the sizes can be perceived 
as two sides of the same bargain portfolio. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the players are 
bargaining on slices of the pie, or trying to agree on size. Hereby, the main advantage of parametric 
procedure is exhibited: it brings about a number of different patterns of interpretations of outcomes 
in the game, linking an outcome, for example, to a suitable size fitting with the resources of an 
economy, etc., all as indicators of most desirable solutions. 
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The game. The game demonstrates how a sugar-pie is fairly sliced between two players: HE is a 
soft negotiator, not very keen on sweets, but with emphasis on quality; SHE is a tough negotiator 
and prefers sweets. 1 
The axiomatic bargaining theory finds the asymmetric Nash solution by maximizing the product 
of players' expectations above the disagreement point 21 d,dd  : 
        121   1 y  x 0   d)y(gd)x(u),y,x(fmax arg , 
the asymmetric variant (Kalai, 1977). 
Although the answer may be known to game theory purists, the questions often asked by many 
include: What are x , y ,  , )x(u  and )y(g ? What does the point 21 d,d  mean? How the 
maxarg  formula is used? The simple answer can be given as: 
x  is HIS slicing the pie, and   is HIS bargaining power, 10  x , 10  ; 
)x(u  is HIS expectation, for example x)x(u  , of HIS x  slicing the pie; 
y  is HER slicing the pie, and 1  is HER bargaining power, 10  y ; 
)y(g  is HER expectation, for example y)y(g  , of HER y  slicing the pie. 
Based on the widely accepted nomenclature, we call )y(g),x(us   the utility pair. The 
disagreement point 21 d,dd   is what HE and SHE collect if they disagree on how to slice the 
pie. The sugar-pie disagreement point is 0021  ,d,dd  , whereby the players collect nothing. 
Further, we believe that expectations from the pie are more valuable for SHE, indicating HER 
desire 70702121 .)(g  , which is greater than HIS desire 5021 .)(u  . 
Now considering the maxarg  formula of ),y,x(f  , one may ask a new question: What is the 
standard that will help to redesign bargaining power   facilitating HIS negotiations to obtain a 
desired half of the pie? SHE may only accept or reject the proposal. A technical person can shed 
light on the solution. We can start by replacing )x(u  with x , xy  1 , )y(g  with x1 , and 
taking the derivative of the result ),x,x(f 1  with respect to the variable x  by evaluating 
),x,x(f x  1 . Finally, with 21x , the equation 02121  ),,(fx   can be solved for  ; indeed 
the equation 02121  ),,(fx   resolves for 31 . 
In general, one might feel comfort in the following judgment: "Even in the face of the fact that 
SHE is twice as tough a negotiator, 2 to count on the half of the pie is a realistic attitude toward 
HIS position of negotiations. Surely, rather sooner than later, since HE revealed that SHE prefers 
sweets whatever they are, HE would have HER agree to a concession." This attitude might well be 
the standard of redesigning the power of HIS negotiation abilities if half of the pie is desirable as a 
specific outcome of negotiations. 
                                                 
1 Note that for the purpose of the game we do not ignore the size of the pie but put this issue temporarily aside. 
2 Let us say that SHE pays HER solicitor twice as much of that of HE does. 
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Next, it will be assumed that in the background of HIS judgment, the quality of the pie first 
increases, when the size is small, but reaching the peak point it starts to decline: the quality, one 
will say, is single peaked upon the size. For HER, the pie is always desirable. The above can be 
restated, then, with the condition that HE seeks an efficient size z  of the pie. Although HE is not 
committed to size z  whether or not to accept the recommendation of HER, HE is committed, 
however, to slice x  aligned in eventual agreement. Let the utility pair g,u  of HIS and HER 
expectations be given by: 
   zz z  21 x)x,(u , y)y,(g  zz ,  10,z ,  10,y,x  . 
Define efficient slices to the size z  as a curve )(x z , which solves 0 )x,( zu z  for x . 
Evaluating x  from 0 )x,( zuz  and subsequently replacing )(x z  into )x,(u z  and )x,(g z , 
yields 2zz )(u  and zzz  43)(g . Hereby, the bargaining problem d,S  reschedules, 
then, into parametric space )(g),(u zzb S  of the size parameter    104321 ,, z . Given the 
scope of negotiations—the interval  4321 , —the root 21  resolves 00
2
1   ),( zz zu , and the root 43  
resolves 01
4
3   ),( zz zu  for z  accordingly. In HIS view the pie must fit the size, since outside the 
interval  4321 ,  it is too small—not useful at all, or too large—and offers a low quality. Therefore, 
the disagreement occurs at 0414321 ,)(g),(ud  . Assuming that the size of the sugar-pie 
remained fixed (fiscally safe) during the delivery to its end destinations, the Nash symmetric 
solution to the game is found at 690.z , 740.x  . On the other hand, HIS asymmetric power 
2120.  is adequate to negotiate with HER about the half of the pie. The size 620.z , fits, for 
example, the necessary power 2120.  capacities of a bakery for the pie preparation. 3 
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3  Once again, to find the Nash symmetric solution a technically minded person must resolve the equation 0 ),(f z z  for z , 
where     141 )(g)(u),(f zzz  when 21 ; 690.z  resolves the equation. Then, resolve the equation 
0690  )x,.(zu  for x , and find that 740.x  . To find the power of asymmetric solution, first resolve the equation 
021  ),( zuz  for z , 620.z , 21x . Then, resolve 0620  ),.(f z   for   and find that the power of HIS that is 
equivalent to 2120. , and is suitable to negotiate with HER when the equal, ½-slicing of the pie is desirable. 
